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Abstract: This essay intervenes in current debates over human 
rights-oriented approaches to literature through a reading of 
Chris Abani’s two novellas. As opposed to critics who want to 
either embrace or unmask human rights in literature, we argue 
that Abani mediates between these two poles through close at-
tention to the ways in which literary form and aesthetic can craft 
a shared ethos between reader and text. In depicting the short 
lives of a child soldier and sex trafficked young girl, he empha-
sizes the limits of the law: the gap between the human subject 
and the legal person whose legal claims are recognizable. At the 
same time, his narratives are not sentimental, and they challenge 
readers to extend a recognition of shared humanity across facile 
divides of right or wrong behavior. If, as Abani posits, we cannot 
become fully human without the courage to unmask ourselves, 
then the endeavor of human rights must also submit to a simi-
lar unmasking of its foundational paradoxes, limitations, preten-
tions, and complicities precisely in order to live into or embrace 
the fuller manifestation of justice toward which it gestures. More 
specifically, we examine the interplay of lyric and narrative voices 
within the context of the novellas to show how Abani deploys 
temporal and aesthetic constructions in response to the limits 
of normative human rights (legal instruments and official dis-
courses). Rather than calling upon the reader’s responsibility and 
fostering literary humanitarianism (which has been extensively 
critiqued as paternalistic by scholars such as Joseph Slaughter 
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and Elizabeth Anker), Abani’s delicate balance of lyric and nar-
rative generates a more complicated ethos of reciprocity between 
the reader and the subjects whom the text calls into being as 
characters.
Keywords: Chris Abani, human rights, child soldiers, sex traffick-
ing, literary humanitarianism, novella, lyric voice

This essay intervenes in current debates over the role of the aesthetic 
in human rights approaches to literature through a reading of Chris 
Abani’s two novellas. As James Dawes notes, “the return of aesthetics 
as a category of interest in literary criticism has generated significant 
suspicion” (“Human Rights in Literary Studies” 399). In the context 
of human rights-oriented criticism, suspicion has often turned to con-
demnation of the aesthetic on the grounds that it not only aestheti-
cizes suffering but, more pointedly, masks the structural imbalances 
that generate human rights violations, cultivates a sense of literary hu-
manitarianism, and substitutes sympathy with the text for action in 
the world beyond it. These different critiques share a common root in 
the work of recognition: the argument that the aesthetic generates a 
readerly response through various forms of identification, perhaps lay-
ered through aesthetic pleasure, with the subjects suffering in the text. 
When the aesthetic produces concern in this way, and sympathy elides 
the distance between reader and subject, it contributes to what Makau 
Mutua calls a “messianic ethos” (231), Lilie Chouliaraki analyzes as 
“‘universal’ morality and grand emotion” (“Post-humanitarianism” 
107), and Joseph Slaughter (Human Rights, Inc.) and Elizabeth Anker 
each critique as literary humanitarianism that re-centers the ostensibly 
secure (read: Western) reader as the paradigmatic liberal subject and, 
thus, the true subject of human rights. Indeed, in Spectacular Rhetorics, 
Wendy Hesford warns explicitly against the “narcissism of pity” 
(Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship of Suffering 209, qtd. in Hesford 48) 
as well as an ethos grounded in Enlightenment universalism. In place 
of pity and universalism, she argues for readings that demonstrate “an 
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awareness of the historical contingencies and rhetorical exigencies of 
ethical responsibility in its entanglement with institutional structures 
and individual lives” (190). 
We share these scholars’ critiques of how the aesthetic may mask his-
torical and geopolitical context and thereby reproduce, under the guise 
of universalism or (mis)identification, the exclusions and imbalances 
of the human rights regime more broadly, particularly its Eurocentric 
conceptual apparatus and the ways in which human rights can provide 
an alibi for political and military intervention. At the same time, we 
are wary of the ways in which the call to move beyond recognition can 
foreclose deeper analyses of how the aesthetic might function in human 
rights literary contexts. We turn to Abani’s novellas as overtly lyrical texts 
that probe the power of the aesthetic and, in doing so, help theorize the 
conditions of their own making. Rather than build complete worlds 
in which a reader might lose herself or full characters with whom she 
might identify, in Song for Night (2007) and Becoming Abigail (2006) 
Abani employs what we term an aesthetic of risk that foregrounds both 
the dangers and the potential of literary representations of violations. 
It is precisely through such aesthetics that he generates an ethos be-
tween reader and text that is grounded in the reciprocal conditions that 
underlie shared vulnerability and the capacity to harm rather than the 
politics of recognition. In using the term “ethos,” we refer not to Abani’s 
unilateral construction of a subject’s character, authority, or appeal, but 
to the relationship that emerges when the reader accepts Abani’s chal-
lenge to imagine at the limits of suffering, desire, beauty, and harm and, 
following Pierre Bourdieu, reflects on the institutional structures that 
frame those representations and readerly responses to them. Abani’s 
human rights ethos refuses to idealize either rights or the victims of 
human wrongs. Instead, he deploys recursive structures and the ten-
sion between lyric and narrative forms to illuminate the exclusion of 
normative human rights (legal instruments and official discourses) as 
well as expand the limits of the alternatives that readers might be willing 
to imagine. If human rights work is distinct from humanitarianism in 
recognizing the political agency of the subject, then Abani asks readers 
to think critically about whether they are willing to imagine that agency 
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for subjects who are far from the idealized victims found in conven-
tional depictions of atrocity.
In “Ethics and Narrative: The Human and the Other,” Abani—poet, 
novelist, essayist, professor, and former political prisoner—writes: 
Let us not begin with definitions. With academic references. 
With proof that many books have been studied on the subject. 
With the notion that for an idea to be singular, purposeful, or 
even useful it must be backed up by the research of others. Let 
us begin with a smaller gesture . . . a story, perhaps. (167) 
The story that he begins, of learning to kill a goat in his rite of passage to 
manhood, reappears in the poem “Histories” from his recent collection, 
Sanctificum:
Boys are taught to kill early,
Five
when I shot a chick in my first ritual.
Eight
when chickens became easy.
Ten
when I killed a goat. I was made to stare 
into that goat’s eyes before pulling
my knife across its throat.
Amen.
I thought it was to teach me the agony 
of the kill. Perhaps it was
to inure me to blood.
To think nothing of the jagged resistance of flesh,
to make the smell of rust and metal and shit familiar.
I have never killed a man, but
I know how, I know I can,
I know that if the timing were right I would.
I am afraid that I might not feel sorry.
I am afraid that I will enjoy it. (77)
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The poem is set in a particular cultural context, although that context 
remains unnamed. Abani refuses romanticism; the act of killing in the 
poem is ignoble and the rationale provided by “ritual” soon falls away. 
By poem’s end, readers understand this killing as abject, made of the 
meeting of rust and blood and metal and shit. The poem thus exposes 
the danger that the act may transcend context and that the shift from 
cultural tradition—killing a chicken or a goat as a ceremonial sacrifice 
or rite of passage—to the murder of a man may be easy. In the begin-
ning of the poem, killing is constructed as a technical skill, a matter 
of know-how, and, to some lesser extent, of moral courage, but as the 
object shifts from cultural expression to a murderous one, and from 
animal to man, killing becomes a matter of daring and even enjoyment. 
Notice the shift in verb tense in the last two lines, the uncertain “I 
am afraid that I might not feel sorry” replaced by the inexorable “I am 
afraid that I will enjoy it.” Notice, too, that the danger of this shift is a 
matter of “timing” rather than circumstance or anger-revenge-justice. 
What does temporality have to do with the ethics of killing? With the 
aesthetics of telling stories of violence and death? 
In both the poem and the essay, as well as other public and literary 
expressions, Abani extends the threads of this small story, especially its 
play with temporality, to weave an expressive fabric from thematic fibers 
of family, language, belief, masculinity, war, shame, and acceptance of 
a shared responsibility for and complicity with violent acts of the past, 
present, and future. Quoting his school friend, a former child soldier in 
Nigeria whose “simple gestures” of covering the goat’s eyes and mouth 
allowed Abani to complete the sacrifice, he concludes that “[p]erhaps 
it is enough, as Emmanuel said, to know that it will always be hard” 
(“Ethics” 173). Killing and conscience come together in shifting con-
texts and destabilize the lines between duty and violation, local con-
text and broader principles. Moreover, Abani couches the story within a 
larger meditation on what fiction and poetry require of both reader and 
writer, rendering Emmanuel’s statement an address to his readers as well 
as to himself. This gesture opens up the question of reciprocity for both: 
reciprocity refers to the mutual recognition of, to paraphrase Hannah 
Arendt, the right to claim rights, as well as responsibility for violent 
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acts that we imagine, commit, and share. This brief example captures 
the ways in which Abani uses multiple genres and styles to move from 
specific contexts to larger meditations on what the aesthetic—those 
representational elements that call upon constellations of affect, desire, 
reason, and belief—can conjure from the reader.
Abani approaches these questions of reciprocity as the foundation for 
a shared ethos through a lyrical style and attention to interiority as a 
window into the structural inequities and political failures that underlie 
egregious human rights abuses. Wary of those who read stories of atroc-
ity, suffering, and human rights abuses with sentimental compassion, he 
asks instead: “What if compassion, true compassion, requires not the gift 
to see the world as it is, but the choice to be open to seeing the world as it 
really is, or as it can be?” (“Ethics” 170; emphasis added). Abani expands 
on the idea of the writer as a person who possesses a rare ability to ob-
serve the world beyond the obscuring apparatuses of denial, privilege, or 
fear, an idea that Nadine Gordimer describes as writers’ “seventh sense 
of the imagination” (86). Abani extends that sense of deep recognition 
to readers and considers them full partners in the “honest conversation” 
that is his work (“Ethics” 169). This collaboration between writer and 
reader recasts a gift, over which one presumably has little control, as a 
choice, the measure of one’s will, or an expression of one’s reciprocity. As 
literature with what Stathis Gourgouris calls “a capacity to theorize the 
conditions of the world from which it emerges and to which it addresses 
itself ” (2), the stories Abani tells in “Ethics and Narrative” (and refigures 
in poems of the same period, as well as in his short fiction) are personal 
and transcendent, attentive to both the limits and transformative pos-
sibilities of language and imagination, and always engage what Dawes 
terms the “ethical risks and possibilities of our language practices” (409).
We turn to Abani’s recent work to examine the ways in which literary 
forms, themselves most often the objects of theory’s gaze, may help us 
to theorize the very problems of human rights representation embedded 
in texts as well as the conditions which make both them and our own 
reading practices possible. For Abani, who continually probes what an 
ethos of human rights might encompass, these conditions are intrinsi-
cally bound to language, what he calls “some deeper human syntax we 
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can only guess at—that we value the lives of others precisely because 
we know the limits of our own” (Abani, “Resisting” 29–30; empha-
sis added). Grounding human rights not in individual dignity and au-
tonomy, as described in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) and reconfirmed in subsequent legal instruments, 
but in the recognition of our shared capacity to harm and be harmed as 
a deep structural arrangement, or “ordering together,” to recall the clas-
sical Greek origins of “syntax,” calls for innovative strategies of literary 
representation that seek alternatives to the teleology of the triumphant 
protagonist or mourned victim. Abani offers a particularly rich oeuvre 
for exploring these strategies because of his range as a writer as well as his 
commitment to both texts’ and readers’ transformative potentials. As he 
told a TED audience in 2008, his 
search is always to find ways to chronicle, to share and to docu-
ment stories about people, just everyday people. Stories that 
offer transformation, that lean into transcendence, but that 
are never sentimental, that never look away from the darkest 
things about us. Because I really believe that we’re never more 
beautiful than when we’re most ugly. Because that’s really the 
moment we really know what we’re made of. (Abani, “Chris 
Abani: On Humanity”)
Much like his naming of the abjection of the kill in “Histories,” Abani’s 
discussion of the merging of beauty and ugliness locates power in and 
demands recognition of the ugly as an integral part of the human. His 
willingness to write at the limits of what readers might accept does not 
reconstitute a universal humanity based on abjection. Instead, it draws 
attention to the very structures that constitute a moral apparatus and 
challenges readers to reflect on their own moral positioning. These 
structures, in turn, include the law, and Abani clearly recognizes the 
limits of human rights in the space between the legal person who may 
claim them and the human subject in whom they ostensibly inhere. His 
work, as demonstrated below, is frequently poised in that gap. 
A similar duality of embracing and unmasking human rights can be 
located in the global contexts that shape the production, circulation, and 
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consumption of literature that may be productively approached through 
the lens of human rights. These contexts frame what Paul Gready terms 
our “responsibility to the story” (170) even as they run the risk of fueling 
a humanitarian, readerly desire for noble and innocent suffering against 
which Abani in particular warns. In “Resisting the Anomie: Exile and 
the Romantic Self,” Abani exposes a hierarchy of exilic positions, with 
the “former political prisoner” (his own position) at its apex (“Resisting” 
24). He asks: “How do the exiles in this situation navigate the romantic 
ideals placed on them and still maintain a degree of integrity? How does 
one keep being human while labouring under this imposed nobility? 
Is there a way to live that faces up to the horrors and displacement felt 
daily, yet resists the anomie of romance?” (24). The concept of “anomie” 
is an interesting one in this context; it is a social deregulation or state of 
normlessness that Abani links to the evacuation of the grotesque from 
our literary forms. Abani uses his own experience of torture to explore 
the profound dehumanization that accompanies the idea of the noble 
sufferer constructed by well meaning others. We add, following Mutua, 
that such constructions are often fueled by an imperializing and racist 
“metaphor of human rights” comprised of victims, savages, and saviors, 
and, as Teju Cole writes, that the constructions in turn fuel the “white-
savior industrial complex.” While the stories Abani tells of his experi-
ence with such well meaning others lend them an air of patronizing 
innocence, he clarifies that this tendency to purify and ennoble the exile 
emerges from the natural human desire to mitigate the “predicament” of 
death at the heart of our state of being (“Resisting” 26). For Abani, the 
aesthetic, as a site where the power of beauty and ugliness can co-exist, 
provides one response to that predicament: “our relationship to the gro-
tesque is as an aesthetic, a device even, to mediate death, as argued by 
Bakhtin. The loss of that aesthetic in our literature and culture forces us 
to seek it out: in the pain and suffering of others and in the subsequent 
ennoblement of the sufferer” (26). A return to the age-old function of 
literature as catharsis, perhaps, but with a twist: rather than dramatically 
enact situations that evoke pity and fear, Abani’s turn to the Bahktinian 
grotesque invites attention to the disavowed ugliness and even abjection 
that are part and parcel of the whole human. In other words, if we could 
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“vent” our need for the mediating influence of the grotesque, and if our 
literature could help us embrace the full range of human experience in-
cluding that which has come to be known as ugly, then we could better 
transcend the constraints of romanticized constructions that, for all of 
their good will, may further dehumanize the already tortured. 
For Abani, who embraces the grotesque in his unflinching portrayals 
of the beautiful and the ugly (and the beautiful in the ugly), the stakes of 
a “deeper human syntax” are revealed most richly in the complex enun-
ciations of the lyric voice. Moving across different literary forms, con-
veying emotion and reflection yet resisting the impulse to romanticize, 
Abani’s lyric calls forth individual, singular experience as well as an ethos 
of the human that might undergird a shared human sense of something 
like ethics, even as his writing acknowledges the impossibility of mani-
festing any such thing—a fine parallel to the project of human rights, 
whose capacious principles become at once limited and effective only at 
the moment they are employed. When the lyric is combined with narra-
tive, as in Song for Night and Becoming Abigail, which take up the issues 
of child soldiers and sex trafficking, respectively, the interplay of lyric 
and narrative allows for a complex reconsideration of the foundational 
terms through which human rights and its ethos might be reimagined in 
the compact between reader and writer. Additionally, the novellas reflect 
on the limitations of the normative human rights discourses that frame 
these violations by focusing on the spaces between the legal person who 
has standing before the law and those characters at the social margins 
whose lives are defined by their situational vulnerabilities.
I. Form and Ethics in Song for Night 
Song for Night challenges classification with its subtitle: “A Novella by 
Chris Abani.” Something of a rare breed, the novella has been treated 
ambivalently by literary critics, who often find it to be less complex and 
sophisticated than a full novel and less condensed and tightly written 
than a short story. One way to think generically about Song for Night is 
as an incomplete Bildungsroman, a novel as violently truncated as the life 
of its protagonist, a child soldier whose spiritual quest is abruptly halted 
as he looks for a way to accept death. Of course, the text is also more 
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complex than that, because of the way that it combines lyric and narra-
tive strategies such that it is rocked between their different temporalities. 
While he has written several full-length novels in addition to the two 
novellas, Abani is also known for his poetry, and Song for Night employs 
a poetic economy of language, image density, and deep structural inte-
riority that raises questions about the trajectory and movement of the 
narrative itself. 
The structure of the novel depends on what Heather Dubrow identi-
fies as the common tendency for narrative to contain and be interrupted 
by lyric. Song for Night’s fifteen-year old protagonist My Luck’s move-
ment forward through the bush and along the river to find members 
of his platoon after a landmine explodes is constructed in short lyrical 
bursts tied to sites that mark his route as a child soldier: battlefields, 
the settings of massacres, abandoned encampments, burned out villages, 
and spontaneous marketplaces. Chapters open with indications of time 
passing, although temporal distinctions grow dimmer as the novella 
progresses: “I wake up confused” (37); “[d]aylight comes like rust cor-
roding night” (61); “I have not returned to the road, though I can see 
it winding around the hill” (163). Bits of My Luck’s experience from 
before his initiation as a child soldier until his death are strung together 
like beads over the strand of the narrative and are discernible as lyrical 
meditations that also correspond to human rights forms: testimonial, 
witnessing, and confession. Taken together, the novella’s parts read as 
a series of tone poems organized not around plot elements but around 
the complex system of signs used by the child soldiers to communicate 
with each other, since their vocal chords have been cut to keep them 
from screaming during their work sweeping for mines. These “chap-
ter” titles—“Memory Is a Pattern Cut into an Arm”; “Dawn Is Two 
Hands Parting before a Face”—divide the narrative flow via a deliber-
ate poetics, employing classical techniques of parallelism and chiasmus 
that heighten our attention to the lyrical elements within the prose. 
The titles also point to one manifestation of the “deeper human syntax” 
for which Abani searches in his exploration of the human, a language 
desperately inscribed on and expressed through the body after the voice 
has literally been cut off. 
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Abani’s turn to embodied expression highlights the limits of the legal 
person as a coherent, bounded, ideally inviolable, and speaking subject 
that Anker analyzes so thoroughly in Fictions of Dignity. In place of the 
phenomenological turn that she explores as an alternative to the dis-
embodied, speaking subject, Abani turns to lyric, as an interruption of 
narrative, to emphasize the need for multiple forms of expression and 
expressibility as well as to denaturalize the forms they take. As Dubrow 
observes, the differences between lyric and narrative have been painted 
with particularly broad strokes in much criticism: “Lyric is static and 
narrative committed to change, lyric is internalized whereas narrative 
evokes an externally realized situation, lyric attempts to impede the for-
ward thrust of narrative” (254). Dubrow tries to address the reductive-
ness of such generalizations in her work on hybrid forms; however, the 
idea of the “forward thrust” of the narrative interrupted by the lyric’s 
interior meditation and perpetual present-tense helps us to think about 
the hybrid form of Song for Night as particularly suited to the ethical 
subjects it calls into being, such as child soldiers, atrocities in times of 
war and peace, wasted lives, and premature deaths. Abani’s narrative 
indeed moves forward on a very simple throughline: My Luck’s search 
for his platoon and his home, the first lost to him when he was killed by 
a detonated landmine and the second when it was destroyed by ethnic 
violence. Yet this linear “thrust” is undone by My Luck’s route through 
the jungle and the bush, which he chooses entirely for reasons he de-
scribes as connected to survival. The path uncannily reproduces his life’s 
experience as a child soldier and thereby allows for lyrical meditation 
on scenes of atrocity after atrocity. That My Luck narrates from across 
the divide of life and death further undoes the narrative trajectory and 
ironizes his search.
The journey, then, recapitulates the circumference of My Luck’s three 
years of service as a child soldier in a condensation of the classic flash 
of one’s life before one’s eyes, with a traumatic repetition and reworking 
of those unbearable events before the novel’s abrupt end with his death. 
This uncanny emplotment offers one way to think about literary form 
theorizing the conditions for its own textual engagement with the ethi-
cal extremity of human rights violations, inasmuch as linearity is main-
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tained and reworked as recursivity in a manner comparable, perhaps, to 
magic realism’s simultaneous employment of the chronological epic and 
diachronic historical narrative to represent the excessive temporality of 
deep-rooted, intergenerational trauma. My Luck muses, “I am on the 
right track, this much is sure. It seems I am retracing my steps through 
places we passed. Something is off about it though, and as much as it 
is nagging me, I cannot pinpoint what it is exactly, but I know it has 
something to do with the chronology of my memories. The time be-
tween them is shrinking, I think” (Abani, Song for Night 56–7). Notice 
the conspicuous lack of conjunctions (and, but, still) between the first 
three sentences, each of which treats a different, perhaps incompatible, 
tempo, but none of which takes note of the possible contradiction of 
its relation to the others. Of course this “retracing” is characteristic of 
trauma and traumatic temporality: My Luck’s movement through the 
jungle in a circle rather than a line, his periodic inability to proceed 
from a space or place for reasons beyond his control, and the triggers 
that recall his most painful memories suggest trauma in its most classical 
Freudian contours from Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
The lyric quality of the narrative, however, distinguishes Song for Night 
from literary texts that innovate in a postmodern sense with temporality 
and spatial disorientation to signify trauma. As My Luck ruminates on 
the temporal structure of the journey—which is, in fact, the story—the 
narrative pauses, engaged in a kind of furious, site-specific meaning-
making without, to borrow again from Dubrow, the “forward thrust” 
of plot development. James Phelan’s theorization of the ethical implica-
tions of the lyric within narrative form is relevant:
The standard tense for lyric is the present. Lyricality, then, in 
contrast to narrativity, is neutral on the issue of change for the 
speaker—it may or may not occur—and invested less in char-
acter and event than in thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, emotions, 
and specific situations. Furthermore, the dynamics of audience 
response stem from adopting the speaker’s perspective with-
out judging it. Thus, the double movement of lyric (that is, of 
what is represented and of the audience’s response) is toward 
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fuller revelation of the speaker’s situation and perspective and 
toward deeper understanding of and participation in what is 
revealed. (635)
Lyric’s shift away from the “issue of change for the speaker” makes it 
particularly appropriate for My Luck, for whom character development 
and coming of age do not portend a rehabilitated, adult future. Phelan’s 
emphasis on the “fuller revelation of the speaker’s situation and perspec-
tive and .  .  . deeper understanding of and participation in what is re-
vealed” reverberates with Abani’s own reflections on ethics and narrative, 
in which he acknowledges the generosity of readers’ sentiments of pity 
or compassion in response to his stories, while noting how such senti-
ments “obscure the deeper intent, the deeper possibility. The point,” he 
exhorts, “is to dissolve oneself into the journey of the protagonist, to 
face the most terrifying thing in narrative, the thing that has been at its 
heart since the earliest campfire and story. To dare ourselves to imagine, 
to conjure and then face all of our darkness and all of our light simul-
taneously” (“Ethics” 169). Abani’s assertion that the goal is “[t]o dare 
ourselves” indicates that when he speaks of readers “dissolving” into the 
text, he does not mean that their close identification with a character 
transports them into the world of the text. Rather, “dar[ing] ourselves” is 
being willing to make the choice, discussed above, to imagine differently 
and at the limits of what might be comfortable.
The lyrical meditations on each scene of violence My Luck revisits 
contain an aesthetic of risk—the simultaneity of darkness and light, 
goodness and ill, and beauty and ugliness that we theorize as part of 
Abani’s construction of a human rights ethos that challenges normative 
human rights discourses. Such images include the horror of a boy riding 
a cadaver downstream to get to dry land and the beauty of that same 
boy burying a skeleton despite “knowing it will be washed away in next 
year’s flood.  .  .  . What is important is that this person be buried. Be 
mourned. Be remembered. Even for a minute” (Abani, Song for Night 
77). Abani gestures to the responses to the violence of civil war that 
exceed the boundaries of the law: no claims are made, nor is justice 
possible. Instead, he writes of the necessity of journeying with the dead 
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and of mourning as a temporal construct. At the center of the book is 
the horror of a boy being forced to rape an old woman, a scene that 
perhaps most strongly conveys Abani’s aesthetic of risk. Describing the 
rape, Abani writes that the woman’s forgiving eyes gaze at My Luck 
“as if all she saw was a boy lost” (85). Her gaze seemingly redeems My 
Luck from his crime even as it shifts the reader’s focus of concern from 
the victim to the protagonist (as opposed to perpetrator). The shift is 
refracted by the beauty of his girlfriend’s recognition of the complex-
ity of that degradation, as “she makes [him] sit by the water and she 
washes [his] face and [his] feet” (59). These descriptions generalize the 
scene from the specificity of My Luck’s forced choice by his commander 
to “rape or die” (85) and his subsequent crime to the notion of how 
reciprocity might be constructed at such moments of extreme violence. 
In passages such as these, Abani dares the reader to imagine reciprocity 
in its largest sense: to recognize the humanity of both the perpetrator 
and the victim through the perpetrator’s ability to harm, be harmed, 
and be loved. This depiction runs the risk of failure, of making readers 
turn from the text out of disgust. Reading this passage, we sometimes 
find ourselves unwilling to countenance the vision of the rapist as “a boy 
lost,” particularly from the perspective of his victim. What brings us 
back to the text, however, is the thought of Abani’s larger project, which 
includes his close attention to the conditions of vulnerability imposed 
by gender and sexuality throughout his fiction and poetry. Whether one 
desires to take up his challenge or turns away, however, one is faced 
with the critical problem of drawing a line between those for whom one 
would acknowledge reciprocity or deny it. Similar challenges ensue. The 
horror, beauty, and simultaneity of teenage love continue at the battle 
scene: “Whenever we raided a town or a village, while the others were 
raping the women and sometimes the men, Ijeoma and I made desper-
ate love, crying as we came, but we did it to make sure that amongst all 
that horror, there was still love. That it wouldn’t die here, in this place” 
(86). Perhaps the extent of the narrative movement in Song for Night is 
simply that My Luck also not die in “that place” of fear and horror, but 
rather finds some form of the acceptance of death that Abani identifies 
as the crucial function of the grotesque in literature.
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Song for Night’s refusal to engage with the “enlightenment,” “educa-
tion,” or “rehabilitation” of its protagonist marks its divergence from the 
classic Bildungsroman as well as normative human rights discourses.1 My 
Luck cannot be saved, rehabilitated, reintegrated into his community, or 
restored to childhood by either a humanitarian or the law.2 His quest is 
eminently pragmatic, if ironically irrelevant: physically, to find his pla-
toon, and spiritually, to find a way to accept death. Because of the nature 
of and context for the quest, the kind of education, enlightenment, and 
even full consciousness that might signify a completed journey is out of 
the question—in other words, the atrocities of war and their embodi-
ment in the figure of the child soldier place both victim and perpetrator 
beyond recuperation or closure in classic narrative form. It is also worth 
noting that this is a Bildungsroman that is not one. That is, My Luck has 
never gotten up from the battlefield where a mine blast has destroyed 
him; his journey takes place only in the imaginative compact between 
author and reader. No matter, however—what is important is that we 
are willing to move haltingly with My Luck as he remembers the site of 
each battle, massacre, and atrocity he was forced or chose to undertake 
or commit, and once in the site, we remain there, alight within the lyri-
cism of interior monologue and dense natural imagery, until the next 
visitation is announced.
Finally, it is not revelation but surrender that informs the abrupt 
ending of My Luck’s story. In the penultimate scene, when he watches 
his platoon leave him behind once more as he struggles to join them on 
the other side of the Cross River, the chapter ends with the line: “I don’t 
care anymore” (165). When My Luck finally arrives on the other side, 
he is able to find home and voice again as he drops his gun and bayonet 
and machete: “I am too tired, I can’t do this anymore. If death is what 
awaits me, I want to face it without fear. I’ve had enough of that” (167). 
My Luck does not put down his weapons because of an epiphany about 
violence; nor does he accept death as a result of what he has learned 
from his journeying. His motivation is simple exhaustion.
Perhaps this surrender hearkens back to the unmasking that Abani 
theorizes literarily in the same way that he does when he tells the story of 
killing the goat. In that story, the protagonist/author fears that in spite 
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of his sorrow over killing a goat, he might enjoy killing a man. He iden-
tifies this self-exposure as a condition of both his writing and his ethic: 
the ability to call forth, expose, and embrace his own vulnerability and 
shame. We can find a similar exposure in the chapter in Song for Night 
entitled “A Question Is a Palm Turning Out from an Ear” which begins 
with a question that ties the individual (My Luck) to the historical (the 
Igbo in the unnamed civil war raging throughout the novella): “If we 
are the great innocents in this war, then where did we learn all the evil 
we practice? . . . Who taught me to kill, a singular joy that is perhaps 
rivaled only by an orgasm?” (143). Like the question, the answer holds 
the tragic doubled truth of the paradox: “I have never been a boy. That 
was stolen from me, and I will never be a man—not this way. I am 
some kind of chimera who knows only the dreadful intimacy of killing” 
(143). The corrosion of innocence, the ecstasy of cruelty, the intimacy 
of killing—and still the small gestures of tears, of the gift of food from 
a stranger on the road, of time taken to bury the dead. My Luck may 
describe the impossibility of becoming fully human in a world in which 
all human rights bets are off, but Abani insists upon the lyrical inscrip-
tion of a destroyed character’s seeking as a foundational human ethos on 
which a culture of rights might begin to be staged. 
And what of history, those specific traumas such as the Nigerian civil 
war that provide—or perhaps only hint at—the plot points of these 
novellas? Abani’s lyrical elements are open to charges of what Eleni 
Coundouriotis calls “arrested historicization,” or the double fault of at 
once divorcing human rights from historical context and, particularly 
in the case of child soldiers or “the victim-perpetrators par excellence,” 
of constructing “a metaphor of African childhood that is politically 
limiting as a characterization of the historical agency of the continent’s 
people” (192; emphasis in original). As Coundouriotis points out, “[t]
he indeterminacy of time and place (these are Ibo characters, but there 
are references to Lexus cars so it cannot be Biafra in 1967) suggest the 
kind of flattening out of time that occurs in memory where the past 
is part of the present consciousness” (195). Rather than a sentimental 
abdication of historical responsibility as Coundouriotis suggests, how-
ever, we read such indeterminacy as a purposeful aspect of Abani’s aes-
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thetic of risk, simultaneously an effect of trauma and the framing of 
a larger historical context encompassing multiple threats to a viable, 
shared national identity: British, American, and French colonial and 
neo-colonial influences as well as sectarian strife. What might appear to 
be contextual errors can also figure as clear signs that the author resists 
the distant reader’s desire for the text to serve as a dependable guide to 
the Nigerian civil war. Perhaps most importantly, such historical inde-
terminacy may be read as part of Abani’s way of asserting that the past is 
part of the present (shared) consciousness, and that this consciousness is 
surely necessary for the imagination of a common future. “What is most 
important . . . when writing, even in a historical moment,” Abani notes, 
paraphrasing Amitav Ghosh, “is not so much the particulars of that 
historical moment, but the texture of the characters’ lives” (“Abigail”). 
This is not, we add, because history does not matter, but because the 
reader plunges into history from the narrative’s scaffolding. From Song 
for Night’s formal tensions and shifting temporalities that denote and 
exceed the Nigerian civil war, then, emerge My Luck’s specificity as well 
as his invitation to readers to reach beyond immediate context to fathom 
a shared “notion of the core of becoming human” (Abani, “Chris Abani: 
The Truthdig Interview”).
II. Haunting and Reciprocity in Becoming Abigail
If, as Slaughter, Lynn Hunt, Julie Stone Peters, and others argue, there 
is a link between the narrative trajectories of human rights law and the 
novel, particularly the Bildungsroman, then the precarious lives of those 
whom Kevin Bales terms “disposable people” present a literary and ju-
ridical narrative challenge. Slaughter is careful to show the limits of the 
mutually “enabling fictions” of law and literature. He demonstrates how 
human rights law often fails those who are most vulnerable to its viola-
tion precisely because they have not been recognized as that incorpo-
rated “person” required for legal and social standing and how stories 
crafted as Bildungsromane fail to represent the lives of people for whom 
the enlightenment, actualization, and recognition promised by that 
genre cannot materialize for the same reason. As compressed and trun-
cated Bildungsromane, Abani’s novellas make manifest the limitations 
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imposed on a child soldier, a sex trafficked teenager, and, by extension, 
others denied full recognition as human subjects by the necropolitics of 
their states or the appetites that devour lives in a global economy. Yet 
Abani does not ask his readers to mourn a loss of childhood innocence 
or lost chances for religious or economic redemption or rehabilitation. 
Such conclusions would ultimately reproduce the paradox of (non-) ap-
plicability that characterizes human rights law and literature and would 
depend upon the structural inequalities between a safe, feeling, benefi-
cent reader and an ostensibly passive victim deserving of the reader’s 
sentimental attachment or pity. Rather than burnish the ideal of “full 
personhood” found in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, herein denied by “the new disposability” (Bales 14) of subjects 
such as Abigail, a Nigerian teenager brought to London by her cousin 
for the purposes of coerced sex work, Abani imagines the process of 
her “becoming” in concert with her transcendent and therefore haunt-
ing qualities. Abani’s portrayal suggests that at the core of reciprocity 
with others rests the deep capacity to be haunted by losses and betray-
als: those we might commit, those we experience, and those committed 
and experienced by others. For Abigail, this entails her emergence from 
her mother’s shadow—a shadow made darker and more sorrowful by 
her mother’s death in childbirth, her betrayal by her extended family, 
and the failure of state policies to “protect” her as a trafficked orphan. 
Through lyric and narrative play, Abani invites readers to ask for what 
Phelan identifies as “participation in what is revealed” (635), although 
the tension in the book is not only between the lyric and narrative tem-
poralities discussed above but also in the implicit spaces between the 
chapter headings of “Then” and “Now.” As Jason Weaver writes, “[t]he 
intransitive word ‘becoming’ is key. The book is about the liminal state 
between things—the gap between girl and woman, male and female, 
past and present, Nigeria and England, the space where things are un-
defined, as with a trauma that is yet to be recognized.” For Abani, issu-
ing an invitation for the reader’s participation in the “becoming” of the 
novel, and more particularly of Abigail, required an aesthetic of risk that 
would convey “the compassion for this voice, the words for this kind 
of tenderness, the courage for this kind of betrayal” (Abani, “Abigail”). 
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Even in its reach toward the ineffable, Becoming Abigail, like Song 
for Night, partakes in the shared cultural work of approaching fiction 
through human rights in that the novella “can illuminate urgent ques-
tions about the relationships among representation, beauty, ethics, and 
politics” even as it resists re-instantiating a conventional human rights 
subject (Dawes, That the World May Know 190). Through literary allu-
sion, formal borrowings from lyric and narrative traditions, Christian 
and Igbo symbolism, and close (if understated) attention to the complex 
legacies of British colonialism, Abani crafts a character who comes up 
against and thereby exposes the unmarked regulations of female sexual-
ity within and across national borders. As Ashley Dawson notes, “by 
tracing its protagonist’s resistance to the forms of gendered subordina-
tion inherent in the family and in current frameworks of legal citizen-
ship, Becoming Abigail represents the struggle for agency of those who 
are rendered human cargo. The novel thereby offers a tacit injunction 
for the transformation of belonging on both a symbolic and juridical 
level” (180–81). 
What is the symbolic economy through which Abani issues this in-
junction? On one hand, Abigail may seem the quintessential, melo-
dramatic “young and naïve innocent (assumed to be female) lured or 
deceived by evil traffickers (assumed to be usually male) into a life of 
horrifying sexual degradation from which escape is virtually impossible” 
(Doezema 4). This characterization of sex trafficking, argue some sex 
worker advocates, depends upon gendered norms of female passivity 
and chasteness versus male agency, ignores economic incentives for sex 
work, and demonizes clients and traffickers as opposed to police and 
the state forces aligned against immigration and sex work.3 We have 
written elsewhere about the ways in which this important critique of 
conventional sex trafficking narratives nonetheless ignores the material 
suffering inherent in most trafficking transactions (Moore and Swanson 
Goldberg). Here we focus instead on how Abani avoids the competing 
narratives of the classic victim who needs saving and the (neoliberal) 
sex worker exercising her rights to migration, bounded autonomy, and 
rational control over her own body in order to map a much more am-
biguous terrain. In place of the victim or the autonomous subject (who 
78
Al ex and r a  S chu l th e i s  Moore  &  E l i z abe th  Swan son  Go ldbe r g
is also recognizable as the conventional subject of human rights), Abani 
imagines characters who are difficult to place within conventional liter-
ary, humanitarian, or human rights terms. Their liminality is scripted on 
many levels: in questions of their temporal existence; autonomy (both 
novellas’ protagonists are located on the threshold of adulthood and in 
contexts in which their autonomy is radically circumscribed); ethical 
responsibility for their capacities to love and harm; and embodiment 
(particularly as opposed to speech). 
Abigail, like My Luck, refuses sentimentality and the seductions of her 
own innocence, and both characters literally inscribe experience and re-
sponsibility onto their bodies. In Song for Night, My Luck contemplates 
“the cemetery on [his] arm,” the cuts he has made for each person he has 
killed, and says: “I . . . tell myself that if I put one foot into the dark-
ness, it would disappear. I tell myself that this is only the shape of my 
guilt: guilt for all the lives I’ve lost or taken, guilt for letting my platoon 
down, guilt for losing my mother, for leaving her to die for me while I 
hid in the ceiling like a little coward” (Abani, Song for Night 152). The 
teenaged protagonist of Becoming Abigail, who also strives to become 
her own person in the wake of the unfathomable loss of her mother 
and namesake, maps her mother across her own body in cigarette burns 
that offer a “varied, different, telling” and later become the dots that 
mark her desire (Abani, Becoming Abigail 33). As with Song for Night’s 
chapter headings, these descriptions of the corporeal do not produce a 
phenomenology of sensations for the reader to share (Abani does not try 
to describe what the cigarette burns “feel like”); rather, the shared trope 
of violent self-inscription for those who (literally or figuratively) have 
no voice asks readers to attend to the possibility of stories that confound 
expectations. By revealing the ugly, shameful, abject, and unthinkable, 
each carefully contextualized in the specifics of the characters’ marginal 
existences, Abani asks for an expansive reciprocity between reader and 
subject without the promise of a happy ending but with hope of a better 
future. 
What could such reciprocity between Abani’s reader and his subject 
look like in practice? How does this concept of reciprocity built into 
the novella’s structure theorize the very conditions that the novella seeks 
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to represent? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “reciproc-
ity” entered the modern lexicon in the 1700s, in part from Immanuel 
Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Metaphysics 
of Morals (1797/99) in which he formulates the concept of a “categorical 
imperative,” cogently summarized by Paul Gordon Lauren as “a univer-
sal duty to protect the intrinsic worth of all individuals in order that 
human beings are never treated as means, but always as ends in them-
selves” (17). Kant’s contribution to the conceptualization of a universal 
imperative of modern human rights is worth citing because Abani pre-
sents us with characters whose humanity has been radically diminished 
in favor of their instrumentality for others. However, Abani adds to this 
definition the characters’ simultaneous capacity to harm themselves and 
others—to push at the limits, in other words, of the reciprocity that we 
as readers might wish to recognize. The challenge for both author and 
reader, then, is to imagine anew the emergent fullness of the subject 
precisely at the moment when we would rather turn away and without 
recourse to a coherent ideal. Abani’s work theorizes the paradoxical rec-
ognition of humanity in what appears to be most dehumanizing: not 
only the protagonist’s degradation and suffering at the hands of her traf-
ficker, but also her crossing the boundaries of propriety in her affair with 
the older, married social worker assigned to her case and, perhaps most 
significantly, her self-mutilation and suicide. The revelation of the abject 
in Abigail’s story, and of her agency in some of the circumstances that 
produce that abjection, deters any sentimental, romanticized readings of 
her as a noble sufferer or object of pity. 
Although Abani scripts Abigail’s vulnerabilities in familiar ways as a 
young, female Nigerian in London who has been sex trafficked with-
out her consent on a false passport, he nonetheless avoids depicting the 
extreme degradations she experiences under her trafficker’s control in 
opposition to a safe and innocent childhood. Abani’s condemnation of 
sex trafficking is lodged not in its exceptionality, although he does not 
shy away from its brutalities, but in its relationships to other forms of 
gendered oppression. Abigail was eight when she recognized her father’s 
“patience .  .  . [and] longing” for her to become her mother (Abani, 
Becoming Abigail 20), and “ten when her first, fifteen-year-old cousin 
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Edwin, swapped her cherry for a bag of sweets, . . . whisper[ing] softly[,] 
‘I will kill you if you tell anyone’” (28). Abigail is twelve when Peter 
molests her at the reception following his marriage to her cousin Mary. 
At fourteen, she is pledged by her father to travel with Peter to London; 
the beating he gives his wife on Abigail’s first night there reveals a hint 
of the subjugation he will also demand of her. 
Ironically, Abigail’s degradation as a human being makes her narra-
tive transformation into a legal subject possible. Chained outside in the 
snow and mud, Abigail spends fifteen days as “a girl slowly becoming 
a dog” (92). On the night of her first “breaking in,” Abigail fights back 
against both the man Peter brings to break her through rape and Peter 
when he tries to punish her for her noncompliance. Her act of resist-
ance, perhaps a newly gendered expression of Frantz Fanon’s human-
izing violence, prompts her captor to make her into a dog: “And this 
is how she was made. Filth. Hunger. And drinking from the plate of 
rancid water. Bent forward like a dog. Arms behind her back. Kneeling. 
Into the mud. And the food. Tossed out leftovers” (Abani, Becoming 
Abigail 92). The reference to Abigail’s transformation from girl to dog is 
not without precedent in Abani’s oeuvre; indeed, the riskiest moments 
of the novella arguably emerge from his poetry collection Dog Woman, 
which was published in 2004 between the initial and final versions of 
Abigail. Inspired by Paula Rego’s paintings of women in “canine poses,” 
the poems, Abani muses, may be “[a]n exploration of the patriarchal 
attempts to contain women and the failure of that containment? .  .  . 
One poet’s journey into the dark haunting of his own masculinity?” 
(Dog Woman 11). It is difficult not to consider these lines in reference to 
Abigail as she is chained, raped, urinated upon, frozen, starved, and “[f ]
eeling for the brandings, for the limits of herself ” in the backyard. For 
Rego, however, “[t]o be a dog woman is not necessarily to be downtrod-
den; that has very little to do with it. In these pictures, every woman’s a 
dog woman, not downtrodden but powerful” (Rego). 
In the novella, Abigail’s transformation to a dog woman is at first 
simply a brutal creation of one subject by another in the global econ-
omy: “this is how she was made” (emphasis added). Soon, however, she 
takes advantage of the only resistance available to her as violated young 
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woman and as dog: “with her teeth [tearing] off Peter’s penis” (Abani, 
Becoming Abigail 95). Her resistance initiates the process of recognition 
before the law and into a new kind of legal personhood. The irony of 
Abigail’s “rescue” is that the protection provided comes in the form of 
incarceration; thus, she becomes a legal subject while lacking the most 
crucial marks of personhood: recognition, autonomy, and choice. Yet 
again, it is only when in protective custody that Abigail finally knows 
and chooses the object of her own desire: Derek, the married social 
worker assigned to her case. In standard moral and legal terms, her affair 
with him may be read as the criminal, immoral act of a man taking 
advantage of a minor who by definition cannot legally consent to sexual 
intercourse, a man further abusing the already profoundly abused, traf-
ficked minor he was meant to protect and serve. That her affair with 
him is her choice is written on her body in the cigarette burns she makes 
after their first lovemaking. She instructs Derek: “This one is you, this, 
me. . . . Here . . . is my hunger, my need, mine, not my mother’s. And 
here, and here and here and here, here, here, here, me, me, me. Don’t 
you see?” (53). The legal personhood she is finally granted as a ward of 
the state comes, then, at the expense of her own becoming (desire, self-
expression, legibility to an other), as she finally claims “Abigail” for her-
self rather than hoping the echoes of her mother will resound through 
her. 
This paradox forms the ethical crux of the novella, as the Abigail who 
deserves the protection and services of the state cannot be reconciled 
with the Abigail who “had been taken and taken and taken. And now 
the one time she took for herself, the one time she had a choice in the 
matter, it was taken away” (117). The state’s betrayal of Abigail is com-
plete when the social worker accompanying her to court for Derek’s 
sentencing vows: “Don’t you worry, sister, that monster is going away 
for a long time” (118). Abani rejects a false transnational sisterhood of 
female sexual innocence that, as the scene’s setting indicates, underpins 
ostensibly favorable yet ultimately paternalistic legal judgments. We 
follow Abani’s shift in focus from Abigail’s constitution as an autono-
mous subject of law and desire to the way her character conveys the need 
for a more expansive, shared human rights culture.
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Abani has described how he “wanted a narrative where it would 
be hard to connect to it any emotional and in some ways conceptual 
framework that had not itself been generated by the narrative” (Abani, 
“Abigail”). In other words, Abani attempts to create a narrative that ex-
ceeds and rejects existing interpretive models and instead theorizes its 
own conditions of being. His approach, which depends on the text’s 
recursive narrative structure, or what one reviewer calls its “nightmare 
logic” (Lipsyte 11), rather than emotional identification, developed as 
he reworked Abigail’s story over the course of a decade. Abani cites his 
early short story, “Jazz Petals” (published in 1996 and based on a news 
story), as one antecedent to the novella. In the story, he imagines the 
coming into sexuality and coming out of the protagonist, Jasmine, who 
prefers Jazz in name and music and evinces the improvisational ways in 
which we each emerge into subjectivities recognizable to ourselves and 
those closest to us. “In retrospect,” Abani says about the two stories, “I 
now see mirrors: the scene in which Abigail comes out to her father, this 
time not sexually, but as a human being” (“Abigail”). To be sure, the 
tragedy of the character in her final form is the failure of those around 
her to recognize her as fully human, a failure that is posed as a challenge 
to the reader. Four years after publishing “Jazz Petals,” the “ghost” of this 
character, born from what Abani calls “ectoplasmic moments” or “ava-
taric manifestations” (“Abigail”), returned in the short story “Becoming 
Abigail,” published in the collection IC3: The Penguin Book of New 
Black Writing in Britain. Here the outline of the final plot has been 
drawn, yet the story adheres more closely to melodramatic conventions. 
Some of the language and imagery of the sexual awakening in “Jazz 
Petals” is echoed in descriptions of Abigail’s desire for Derek: “Unfurling 
before his rain, her petals kissed his sun, winding-vine-hope” (Abani, 
“Becoming Abigail” 248). However, the polarization of romantic love 
with a gentle man and the brutality of sexual slavery ultimately yield a 
rather conventional character more in keeping with the British tradition 
of the hysterical woman on the banks of the Thames that Abani also 
cites as an influence (Abani, “An Interview”). 
The novella, published in 2006, takes more risks with narrative struc-
ture and characterization. Chapter headings of “Then” and “Now” create 
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a narrative line that is continually undone by the attention to liminal 
spaces, times, and identities as well as Abani’s reach toward the ineffable. 
The binary temporality between then and now does not correspond to 
the process of becoming, as in the standard Bildungsroman, but rather, 
ultimately, to the work of haunting: 
There’s a lot of playing with Christian symbolism.  .  .  . As 
[Abigail] begins to gain agency over her body, the body begins 
to solidify, so the names become clearer. Her references to Igbo 
culture become clearer. Towards the end, the body, which was 
ephemeral before, is beginning to collect and solidify. And yet, 
just at the moment when it all comes together, it transcends 
into this ephemerality once more. (Abani, “An Interview”) 
Abani regularly turns to this kind of religious symbolism to describe 
the transformation and transactions he intends his fiction to accom-
plish. In religion’s attempt to provide a form for one’s experience with 
the ineffable, he finds a language for witnessing as well as rituals that 
“hel[p] orchestrate these creative interventions” (Abani, “Painting”). 
Significantly, his turn to ritual is another indication of why his aesthetics 
are so pronounced—why, in other words, his fiction about atrocity dis-
plays a keen awareness of the dangers of aestheticizing violence and suf-
fering and, notwithstanding those dangers, repeatedly draws attention 
to its aesthetic constructions. In devising his own creative rituals such 
as patterns of imagery, metaphor, and structure, Abani tries to capture 
and make visible that “deeper human syntax.” Abigail’s ephemerality, for 
example, much like the lyricism of his prose, may threaten to supersede 
or erase the corporeal horrors of her circumstances such that we lose the 
material human subject in a turn toward rights or an ethos of reciprocal 
human responsibility. More productively, we propose, that ephemeral-
ity may gesture toward the inadequacy of those categories of agency 
and identity, noted by child protective services, in which Abigail would 
become recognizable: “Mother died during childbirth. Child probably 
abused by successive male relatives” (Abani, Becoming Abigail 109).
In the process of bringing Abigail into being—from the news sto-
ries upon which her story is based, through her early manifestations 
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in “Jazz Petals” and the short story “Becoming Abigail,” until her final 
realization in the novella—Abani has shown how Abigail’s humanity 
cannot be captured by the strictures of the legal rights regime or the 
traditional literary narrative. Her beauty is linked with the ugliness of 
her self-mutilation as assertion of both grief and desire, her humanity 
with the moment she becomes a dog at the hands of her trafficker, the 
difficulty of countenancing her sexual desire, and the assertion of her 
life at the moment she chooses death. Abani’s work here and in Song 
for Night manifests the search for an ethos of reciprocity within a world 
cracking under the weight of its rights violations. The articulation of 
this search depends on, yet seeks to transcend, the context of specific 
violations: child soldiers, sex trafficking, organ trafficking, targeting ci-
vilians during civil war, and the suspension of civil and political rights. 
For Abani, such an ethos is necessarily embedded in culture, tradition, 
and interpersonal human exchange even in the midst of massive human 
rights abuses, yet must be accessible beyond those boundaries. It is made 
visible in the imaginative work of language and literatures. His vocal 
commitment to this ethos positions Abani as a writer who deconstructs 
the binary construction “embrace/unmask” often posited with regard 
to normative human rights, because in his representational work he is 
always unmasking and revealing the beautiful ugliness, nearly unbear-
able twoness or “both/and-ness” of human behavior (what he calls “the 
dialectic”), and the obviously compromised nature of human rights talk/
policy/law (Abani, “Resisting” 22). Unmasking provides the catalyst for 
a wider embrace predicated not on idealized identities but on reciprocity 
in its fullest sense. Thus, his aesthetic of risk necessarily produces ethical 
ambiguity, because ambiguity and “approximation” “allo[w] everyone 
into the conversation” (Abani, “Painting”). 
Notes
 1 In Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law, 
Slaughter argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the classic 
Bildungsroman are mutually “enabling fictions” (4) that plot the idealized de-
velopment of the human rights subject and protagonist, respectively, in parallel 
ways through categories such as education. 
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 2 For an analysis of the relationship of contemporary Nigerian fiction of African 
child soldiers in relation to the Convention of the Rights of the Child and its 
Optional Protocols, please see Schultheis’ “Global Specters.” 
 3 See Doezema’s Sex Slaves and Discourse Masters. See also Agustin, Sex at the Mar-
gins; Doezema and Kempadoo, Global Sex Workers; and Kempadoo et al., Traf-
ficking and Prostitution Reconsidered.
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